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define the nature of the conflict and assumed that Nigeria was waging a "war on terror". This operational and conceptual misnomer has hampered analysis. Even in the medical sciences, the correct diagnosis of any ailment or disease is the first step towards effecting a cure. A wrong diagnoses or prescription would exacerbate the condition or might even kill the patient. The assertion here is that for Nigeria to be able to develop a more effective anti-Boko Haram strategy, it is important to recognize the nature of the conflict in the North-Eastern part of the country. This article seeks to demonstrate that the war between the Nigerian state and Boko Haram is not strictly a terrorist campaign and a war on terror, but rather an example of 'Hybrid Warfare' . [15] 
Hybrid Wars
What is hybrid warfare (HW)? Hybrid wars involve a range of different models of warfare that include conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorism in its various manifestations (such as kidnappings, beheadings and suicide-bombings) and criminal activities. [16] It incorporates multi-modal activities that can be conducted by separate units, or even the same unit, but are strategically directed, connected and coordinated within the contested zones to achieve synergistic effects. [17] The space where Hybrid Wars take place is called the contested zone (CZ). [18] It is that space where the opposing forces meet, trying to realize their economic, political, social and religious objectives by means of force and psychological operations. These CZs generally include generally include, but are not limited to, the dense urban centres (the scene of urban warfare), jungles, borderlines and mountains (the scenes of guerrilla warfare), and attacks on religious, cultural and educational centres (through acts of terrorism). [19] In the conflict zone, hybrid warfare combines two modes of warfare-conventional and asymmetric warfare-simultaneously and synchronously. These forms of conflict waging are used interchangeably as the situation demands. Hybrid wars bring together some of the lethality of state conflict waging with the unrestained violence of asymmetric warfare. In such conflicts, adversaries (state, state-sponsored groups, mercenaries, terrorist groups, freedom fighters) exploit access to modern and sophisticated weapons and communication technologies to wage protracted conflicts.
Hybrid wars are different from conventional warfare, combining tactics, methods, weapons and strategies of conventional and unconventional warfare. [20] Engaging in such wars involve the use of ambushes, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide-bombings , sexual assaults as well as targeted assassinations. While the two modes are operationally integrated and tactically fused, the irregular component tends to become operationally decisive rather than just protract the conflict (as in guerrilla war), provoke overreactions (as with terrorism) or extend the cost of security for the defender (as in a counter-insurgency). A recent example of hybrid warfare is the blistering run of the Islamic State (IS) over Tikrit and Mosul in Iraq in 2014. [21] Islamic State fighters made use of an array of sophisticated weapons (M1A1 Abrams battle tanks and M198 towed howitzers) coupled with a well-trained militia force that used both conventional and unconventional modes of warfare, to engage and dislodge the U.S.-trained Iraqi army. [22] Apart from the use of quasi-military formations and modern military tactics (learned from officers from Saddam Hussein's armed forces), the fighters of what was soon to become the Islamic State also made use of suicide-bombings, IEDS and ambushes.
Hybrid wars come in three sub-types:
Fourth Generation Warfare has at its core the idea that the weakening of the state as an organizing and governing mechanism results in the rise of non-state actors willing and able to challenge the legitimacy of the state.
[23] The role of political will and internal social cohesion is central to the construct. The 4GW actor uses a range of conventional and unconventional means, including terrorism and disinformation disseminated in cyberspace, to undermine the will of those defending the existing state, to de-legitimize its government and to stimulate an internal breakdown of the social fabric. [24] ii. Compound Wars (CW) are those major wars that have significant regular and irregular components which exist next to each other but under unified direction. [25] It occurs when a considerable degree of strategic coordination exists between state and non-state forces in a CZ. The complementary effects of CW are generated by the ability to exploit the advantages of each component. [26] The non-state part attacks weak areas and forces a conventional opponent to disperse its forces.
iii. Unrestricted Warfare involves the synchronous mobilization of all the resources and assets at the disposal of one or both opposing forces in the CZ. [27] It is warfare beyond the traditional military domain. The concept refers to the extensive and deliberate use of the totality of the national resources and assets of a state in such warfare, including financial, trade, religious, social, cultural and virtual (cyberspace) resources and human resources (conscripted children and under age fighters).
In the light of these new manifestations of hybrid warfare, let us revisit some phases of the armed conflict between Boko Haram and the armed forces of Nigeria.
Boko Haram: Origin, Tactics and Strategy
The Before 2010, Boko Haram had no apparent strategy on how to achieve its objectives in Northern Nigeria. [38] It used occasionally guerrilla tactics of hit-and-run to harass and oppress Nigerians in its area of operations. Its weapons were rudimentary: clubs, machetes, Molotov cocktails, knives, swords and locally made guns. Boko Haram militants sometimes shot sporadically from 'okada' (local slang for motorcycle) at their targetsboth civilians and police officers-before speeding away. [39] This, however, began to change after 2010 as the group started using bombs and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on strategic locations. 
The External Dimensions to the War
The Nigeria-Boko Haram conflict has its origins in Nigeria. The main theatre of operations of the war is northern Nigeria. However, the activities of the opposing forces have extended the War beyond the borders of Nigeria. The reasons for these extensions are obvious. All belligerents assumed that external involvement was to be crucial to achieve their overall strategic objectives. To Nigeria, externalizing the conflict ensured international support to check the insurgency. Crucially, externalizing the conflict, especially couching it in terms of a war on terror, has allowed Nigeria greater access to foreign military hardware, know-how and funds. Apart from forging links with other jihadi groups, Boko Haram, through its activities in the territories of Nigeria's neighbours, also externalized the war territorially. The group is also active in Niger, Chad and Cameroon. For example, Boko Haram attacked a police station in Kousseri and a Chinese-run engineering company in Cameroon in 2014. [65] It also launched a devastating attack on Ngouboua in Chad in February 2015. [66] The reasons for the extension of the war into these countries are also strategic. On the one hand, the group wanted to show to Al-Qaeda Central and later IS that its reach covers the whole of West Africa [67] Finally, extending its operations into neighbouring Cameroon, Chad and Niger ensured the continuous supply of men and materiel from the Maghreb, particularly Libya. The extension of the war across borders also offered Boko Haram a safe haven beyond the reach of Nigerian troops [68] The Nigerian government, on its part, externalized the war for two strategic reasons. The first was to compel its neighbours at the frontline of the war, especially Cameroon, to help in policing its porous borders and to prevent Boko Haram from attacking Nigeria from across the borders. The second, more important, reason was for Nigeria to garner international military and political support against Boko Haram. To this purpose, the Nigerian government signed bi-and multi-lateral security agreements with its neighbours and with select strategic partners beyond them. For instance, in February 2012, Nigeria had signed a security treaty with Cameroon. [69] The treaty secured, among other things, Cameroonian assistance for Nigeria's fight against Boko Haram in the border areas. In October 2012, Nigeria had signed a similar treaty with Niger, establishing joint security patrols along the borders. [70] . In addition, Nigeria signed a strategic 20-year security-training pact with Britain in 2015, providing it with counterterrorism and COIN training. [71] Using multilateral mechanisms, Nigeria was able to expand the scope of operations of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to include tackling the Boko Haram in the West African sub-region. However, the establishment of the MNJTF predated the Nigeria-Boko Haram war. It originally came into being in 1994 to combat trans-border banditry in the northern part of Nigeria and comprises troops from Cameroon, Niger, Chad and Benin. [72] The emergence of the Boko Haram expanded the scope of operation of the MNJTF's to include counter-terrorism. [73] The headquarters of the MNJTF, which was initially at Baga, Bornu state in Nigeria, had to be relocated to N'Djamena in Chad, following the coordinated attack launched against it by Boko Haram in January 2015. [74] In September 2015, from its new base in Chad, the MNJTF launched a well-coordinated attack against the Boko Haram in Bornu state. [75] Through this offensive, the Boko Haram lost swath of territories that it has hitherto held on to and from where it had resorted to guerrilla tactics to undermine northern Nigeria. Additionally, in June 2014, Nigeria signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) establishing an External Intelligence Response Unit (EIRU) with the United States, Britain, France, Benin, Chad, Cameroon and Niger. [76] The Nature of the War, 2010-2015
The conflict with Boko Haram has gone through three different iterations. In the beginning, the Nigerian government perceived it to be a form of civil unrest when it reared its head between 1995 and 2002. [77] Subsequently, it came to be seen as a religious uprising between 2002 and 2009. [78] Between 2010 and 2015, the war took its final form. It became a war on terror on the one side and an insurgency on the other. [79] It is from this final form that the true nature of the war can be gleaned. It is the contention of this article that the war is not a mere terror campaign but amounts to hybrid war. This assumption is based on, among other things, the tactics and strategies, aims and objectives and the choice of weapons used in prosecuting the war by the adversaries.
A war has some basic definable features. Although its contemporary definition now encompasses asymmetric warfare, it still has some generally accepted characteristics. [80] One of these is the observance of established rules of engagement. Normally, the combatants take special care during engagements to shield noncombatants from the violence of war. Proportionality is also an established norm. [83] In the two encounters, over 500 lives were lost. What became noticeable in the course of the confrontation was that the adversaries simultaneously employed asymmetric and conventional tactics and strategies in waging the war. This is why the Nigeria-Boko Haram conflict can be described as a form of hybrid warfare.
The Nigeria-Boko Haram war has gone through the different phases earlier enumerated above. Elements of unrestricted warfare could be seen in the use of girls (as young as 10 years old) as suicide bombers. [84] In the Fourth Generation warfare phase, which occurred within the same period, the group effectively tried to undermine the sovereign integrity of the Nigerian state. It tried to achieve this through incessant and ubiquitous attacks on civilian and military structures in Nigeria.
The aim was to demonstrate to Nigerian citizens that the government did not have the capacity to protect them. This was probably also the main reason why the group carried-out the brazen kidnapping of more than 200 Chibok girls from their school in Borno in 2014. [87] The repeated attacks against military infrastructure targets (such as barracks and munition depots) were designed to show the citizens that the Nigerian military even lacked the capacity to protect itself. The Internet played a crucial role in the propaganda efforts of the group. Since the government could not effectively censor what was posted on-line, Boko Haram used YouTube to disseminate its threats against the Nigerian state. The exploits of the group against Nigeria in the CZs as well as its administration of the localities under its control were posted online. All these efforts were geared towards the delegitimization of the authority of the State in what amounts to acts of psychological warfare.
During the compound warfare phase, the opposing forces deployed asymmetric and conventional tactics and strategies simultaneously in the CZs. In some cases, there were even instances of role reversal with the military taking up the guise of the insurgents and the insurgents doing vice-versa. Nigeria established a special Counter Terrorism Squad (CTS) the aim of which was to go into Boko Haram territory in the CZs and complement the efforts of the military forces. [88] Militants from Boko Haram in turn sometimes posed as regular Nigerian forces in order to make it easier for them to launch surprise attacks on the villages in the CZs. This was what happened when Boko Haram attacked Gwoza Local Government Area in Borno state in 2014. [89] Moreover, Boko Haram adopted a conventional military mode to confront the Nigerian forces during this phase. A prime example was the attack on Baga military barrack in January 2015. A video released by Boko Haram of the confrontation shows how it attacked the military barrack frontally, using vehicle-mounted machine guns and lots of AK-47-wielding infantry foot soldiers. This is not unlike how a regular army would attack its opponent's base in a conventional war. On the Nigerian government's side, the CJTF played crucial roles during this phase of the war. It acted as the unofficial intelligence-gathering unit of the SMJTF and, in many instances, acted also as the first line of defense against the insurgents.
[90] In March 2014, the SMJTF was able to foil a bomb attack on an Internally Displaced Persons' camp in Maiduguri due to the timely intelligence provided by the CJTF. On several occasions the involvement of the CJTF in actual combat operations was decisive to defeating Boko Haram attacks in the CZs. [91] Thus, the simultaneous and synchronous use of conventional (JTF) and unconventional (CJTF) forces and the use of conventional and unconventional tactics qualify the situation as being one of compound warfare.
Conclusion
To bring any major armed conflict to an end, it is important to understand the nature of the war. The South African mercenaries were effective against Boko Haram because they had a better understanding of the nature of the war in northern Nigeria. Hence, their adoption of the tactic known as 'relentless pursuit' . Nigeria has variously referred to the conflict with Boko Haram as a terrorist campaign, a religious war and an insurgency. In line with this reasoning, the government had tried various strategies which did not fit the kind of warfare being fought by Boko Haram. The army's own approach had failed to quell the activities of Boko Haram, partly for lack of fighting motivation of the soldiers, partly due to the corruption and incompetence
